Almost every hunting-lease article you will ever read repeats the same sentence: your state recreational use statute protects you from liability, but charging a fee may weaken that protection. It is the safest sentence in the industry, and it is wrong about half the time.

We read the operative statutory text in all twenty states where HuntLease publishes a state lease guide. Not summaries, not secondhand explainers — the code itself. The question was narrow and specific: when a landowner cashes a hunting-lease check, does the recreational use statute still stand behind them?

The answer is not one answer. It is three.

  • Ten states strip the protection the moment money changes hands. The lease payment is a "charge" and the statute stops applying to the people who paid it.
  • Six states keep the protection anyway. Four of them say so in the operative text, in words that were deliberately written to cover hunting leases.
  • Four states depend on a detail almost no landowner has ever heard of — a dollar cap, a tax multiple, the difference between agricultural and non-agricultural ground, or whether the lease is written on a "limited entry basis."

If you own ground in one of the six, you have been carrying a fear you did not need. If you own ground in one of the ten, the generic reassurance you have been reading is worse than useless, because it told you that you were probably fine. And if you own ground in one of the four, the outcome turns on a clause you can actually control.

The 20-State Answer Table

Here is the whole finding in one place. "Voids" means the statute's protection stops applying to the hunters who paid. "Preserved" means the operative text keeps the protection in place despite the payment. "Conditional" means it depends on a specific, checkable fact about your land or your lease.

StateStatuteEffect of a paid hunting leaseThe clause that decides it
AlabamaAla. Code § 35-15-40PRESERVEDA dedicated Landowners Protection Act for hunting and fishing leases, with no fee condition at all
ArkansasArk. Code § 18-11-307(2)PRESERVEDLease consideration is expressly carved out of the definition of "charge"
GeorgiaO.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-21, 51-3-23, 51-3-25VOIDSProtection runs only to an owner who permits use "without charge"; the only lease carve-out is for land leased to the State
Illinois745 ILCS 65/2(d), 65/4, 65/6(b)VOIDSThree independent paths to the same result, plus an express carve-out where the owner "charges"
IowaIowa Code §§ 461C.2(2), 461C.6(2)VOIDSThe broadest definition in the country — "charge" means "any consideration" — and the charge exception names deer hunting outright
KansasK.S.A. 58-3204, 58-3206(b)CONDITIONALThe charge exception applies only to non-agricultural land; agricultural land keeps the protection fee or no fee
KentuckyKRS 411.190(1)(d), (6)(b)VOIDSStandard "without charge" gate; the lease proviso covers only land leased to the state
LouisianaLa. R.S. 9:2791, 9:2795PRESERVEDProtection covers use "with or without charge" and is expressly unaffected by "the granting of a lease"
MarylandMd. Nat. Res. §§ 5-1104, 5-1106, 5-1109CONDITIONALCharging normally kills it, but a 2017 carve-out rescues hunting "on a limited entry basis, with or without charge"
MississippiMiss. Code §§ 89-2-7, 89-2-27(b)VOIDSBoth articles fail on a fee; the only excepted consideration is government money
MissouriMo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.345(1), 537.348(2)VOIDSLiability preserved for anyone "who has paid a charge for entry," with no government-lease carve-out at all
North CarolinaN.C.G.S. §§ 38A-2(1), 38A-3, 38A-4VOIDSBroad "charge" definition; but § 38A-4(b) expressly preserves written liability releases, which becomes the real protection
OhioOhio Rev. Code §§ 1533.18(B), 1533.181PRESERVED"A lease payment or fee paid to the owner of privately owned lands" is expressly excluded from what destroys recreational-user status
OklahomaOkla. Stat. tit. 76 § 10.1; tit. 2 §§ 16-71.1 to 16-71.7PRESERVED"Hunting or fishing leases" are excluded from the statutory definition of "charge"
Pennsylvania68 P.S. §§ 477-2(4), 477-4, 477-6(2)VOIDS"Charge" is the admission price or fee asked for permission to enter; only leases to the Commonwealth are excepted
South CarolinaS.C. Code §§ 27-3-20(e), 27-3-40, 27-3-60(b)VOIDSStandard "without charge" gate; state-lease carve-out only
TennesseeT.C.A. §§ 70-7-102, 70-7-104, 70-7-105PRESERVEDThere is no charge exception anywhere in the operative sections, and § 70-7-105 openly contemplates entry "for a consideration"
TexasTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 75.003(c), 75.004(a)CONDITIONALCharges are fine up to 20 times last year's property taxes — or unlimited if you carry the statutory insurance limits
VirginiaVa. Code § 29.1-509(A), (D)VOIDSProtection is lost "when the landowner receives a fee" — though the statute's exclusion for "rentals" is genuinely unsettled (see below)
West VirginiaW. Va. Code §§ 19-25-2(b), 19-25-4(b), 19-25-5CONDITIONALA hard cap: "charge" may not exceed $50 a year per participant. Almost every real lease clears it

Source: HuntLease review of the operative statutory text on each state's official code site, September 2026. Statutes change; the currency notes for each state are in that state's guide. This is general information, not legal advice.

What the split actually looks like

Twenty states, three outcomes:

Charge VOIDS it██████████10 states
Charge PRESERVED██████6 states
CONDITIONAL████4 states

Chart 1. One block equals one state. Based on the twenty states with a HuntLease state lease guide, September 2026.

Half the states we cover void the shield. That is not a small minority position, and it is not a majority one either — which is precisely why the generic warning has survived so long. It is right often enough to sound responsible and wrong often enough to be useless.

Why "without charge" is the whole ballgame

Every one of these statutes was written for the same reason. In the 1960s, states wanted private landowners to open ground to the public for recreation. The obstacle was premises liability: a landowner who lets someone hunt has arguably turned that person into a licensee or invitee, with all the duty of care that carries. So legislatures wrote statutes that knock the duty down to something close to what you owe a trespasser — but only, in most states, if you are not being paid.

That is the entire design. The protection is the state's side of a bargain: open your land for free and we will shield you. The moment you charge, the bargain is off, because the legislature was not trying to subsidize a business.

Which means the operative question in any state is almost never "am I protected?" It is "what does this state's code count as a charge?" That is a defined term, and the definitions vary enormously:

  • Iowa is the broadest. Iowa Code § 461C.2(2) defines charge as "any consideration, the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter." Those first two words reach barter, labor, a share of the meat, and food-plot work traded for access. If you are in Iowa and you thought you were safe because no cash moved, read that definition again.
  • Missouri sweeps in some free access. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.345(1) counts permission given "for the purpose of sales promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering business purposes" as a charge even when no money is asked.
  • Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Georgia, South Carolina and Kansas all use the narrow, near-identical formula: "the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land." A cash lease is squarely inside it.
  • Ohio, Oklahoma and Arkansas wrote leases out of the definition. Same statutory architecture, opposite result, because someone amended the definition on purpose.
  • Texas did not define "charge" at all. It built a math test instead.

Three states got a different answer than their neighbors because a legislature spent one sentence on it. That is the whole story.

The six states where the check does not cost you the shield

Ohio is the cleanest. Ohio Rev. Code § 1533.18(B) defines a "recreational user" as someone granted permission "without the payment of a fee or consideration" — and then, in the same sentence, excludes "a lease payment or fee paid to the owner of privately owned lands." A hunter paying you lease rent is still a recreational user, and § 1533.181 immunity still applies. Ohio also expressly says posting does not matter: the protection applies "whether or not the premises are kept open for public use and whether or not the owner … denies entry to certain individuals." Note the limit — § 1533.181(B) reaches privately owned, non-residential premises.

Alabama did not amend a definition; it wrote a separate statute. Ala. Code § 35-15-40, the Landowners Protection Act (Act 2011-293), says a landowner who "leases property for hunting or fishing purposes shall not be liable for any damages to any person based on the use of the leased property for hunting or fishing purposes." No fee condition. No posting requirement. It is the most direct sentence on this subject in any of the twenty codes. Its exceptions are narrow and specific: actual knowledge at the time of the lease of a non-obvious dangerous condition that you did not disclose, and intentionally or willfully causing injury.

Tennessee reaches the same place by leaving something out. T.C.A. § 70-7-102 removes the duty of care with no "without charge" qualifier anywhere, and § 70-7-104 lists the only two things that defeat the protection — neither of which is a fee. Then § 70-7-105 gives the game away: it lets an adult entering land "for such person's use for a consideration" sign a written waiver. The statute plainly contemplates paid access. Caveat we will state plainly: we verified this from the statutory text and did not run the Tennessee case law on whether courts have read a commercial-use limit into § 70-7-102. Treat it as strong but not bulletproof.

Louisiana is the most explicit about leases specifically. La. R.S. 9:2795(B)(1) covers an owner who permits use "with or without charge," and both 9:2795(F) and 9:2791(D) say the limitation is not affected "by the granting of a lease, right of use, or right of occupancy … or by the posting of the premises." Louisiana's boundary is not the fee; it is whether the land is "used principally for a commercial, recreational enterprise for profit." Leasing your timber tract to a deer club is not that. Running a lodge with guides and packages moves you toward it.

Oklahoma amended the definition. Okla. Stat. tit. 76 § 10.1(A)(2)(d)(3) excludes "hunting or fishing leases" from what counts as a charge, effective November 2013. On top of that, most leased Oklahoma ground is also covered by the Limitation of Liability for Farming and Ranching Land Act, tit. 2 §§ 16-71.1 to 16-71.7, which has no fee exception at all.

Arkansas did the same thing with one clause: Ark. Code § 18-11-307(2) carves lease consideration out of "charge."

Four of those six — Ohio, Alabama, Oklahoma, Arkansas — are states where a legislature specifically decided that hunting leases should keep the protection. That is not an accident of drafting. It is policy, and it is worth knowing which side of it your state landed on.

The four conditional states, where you can change the answer

Texas: the 20x tax test, and the ag-exemption trap

Texas is the only state in the twenty that built a math test. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.003(c) says chapter 75 applies to an owner who either does not charge for entry, or charges but whose total recreational charges collected in the previous calendar year "are not more than 20 times the total amount of ad valorem taxes imposed on the premises for the previous calendar year."

Three things landowners consistently get wrong about that sentence. It aggregates all recreational charges across the entire premises — deer lease plus dove lease plus fishing plus camping, not per-lease. It is measured on the previous calendar year, so it is a backward-looking test. And there is an independent second door: § 75.003(c)(3) brings you inside the chapter regardless of how much you charged, if you carry liability insurance at the § 75.004(a) limits — $500,000 per person, $1 million per occurrence for bodily injury or death, $100,000 per occurrence for property damage.

Here is what the cap actually buys you at different tax bills, against real lease values:

Annual property tax on the tractMaximum recreational charges (20x) 
$150███$3,000
$250█████$5,000
$500██████████$10,000
$750███████████████$15,000
$1,000████████████████████$20,000
For scale, from HuntLease calculator runs:
Median annual lease value█████$4,790
90th-percentile lease value█████████████$12,600

Chart 2. One block equals $1,000. Caps computed from Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.003(c)(2). Lease values are HuntLease Lease Price Calculator outputs across 321 runs in 38 states — these are what landowners and hunters modeled, from a self-selected sample, not verified signed-lease prices.

And here is the part nobody publishes. The Texas safe harbor is a multiple of your tax bill. An agricultural or wildlife-management valuation is the single most effective way to shrink that bill — which means the same exemption that saves you thousands in property tax also shrinks your liability safe harbor by the same proportion. A 600-acre tract paying $220 a year under an ag valuation has a $4,400 ceiling on recreational charges. A median-value lease walks right up to it, and a good one clears it. The landowners most exposed to the 20x test are precisely the ones who did the smart thing on their taxes.

If that is you, the answer is not to give up the exemption. It is § 75.003(c)(3): carry the insurance limits, and the cap stops mattering.

Kansas: agricultural versus non-agricultural

Kansas split its statute in 1988 and most people never noticed. K.S.A. 58-3206(b) preserves liability where "the owner of nonagricultural land charges" — the word is right there in the operative text. K.S.A. 58-3204 protects owners of land generally with no charge qualifier, and separately protects owners of non-agricultural land only "without charge." The Kansas Attorney General read it the same way in Opinion No. 2003-27: an agricultural landowner is protected "whether or not a fee is charged"; a non-agricultural one only if no fee is charged.

So in Kansas the question becomes whether your tract is "land suitable for use in farming" under § 58-3202(e), which covers cultivation, grazing and livestock production. Row-crop and pasture ground is comfortably in. Pure timber or enrolled CRP is a real question, and it is a fact question, not a formality. Two neighbors can land on opposite sides of this line. An AG opinion is persuasive, not binding, and we found no Kansas appellate decision applying § 58-3206(b) to a paid hunting lease on farm ground.

Maryland: it turns on how the lease is structured

Maryland is the most interesting of the four because the answer depends on something you write into the contract. The normal rule is unfavorable: Md. Nat. Res. § 5-1104 protects owners who permit recreational use without charge, and § 5-1106(a)(2) removes protection where the owner charges. But that exception opens with the words "Except as provided in § 5-1109(a)(2)" — and § 5-1109(a)(2), added in 2017, covers hunting "on a limited entry basis, with or without charge," under which the hunter impliedly assumes responsibility for their own safety. Section 5-1109(b) then applies the permission-card provisions to leased hunting ground.

Read together: a Maryland lease to a defined, limited, named group can sit inside the carve-out. A lease to an open or undefined group, or one that functions as general paid access, probably cannot. The operative condition is "limited entry basis," and it is one clause in your lease agreement away.

West Virginia: a $50 ceiling

West Virginia is conditional on paper and effectively unfavorable in practice. W. Va. Code § 19-25-5 defines "charge" as the money asked for permission to enter "which may not exceed $50 a year per recreational participant," and the definition of a non-commercial recreational activity independently excludes anything charging more than $50 per year per participant. A ten-member club at $600 a head is twenty-four times over the line. We are not aware of a West Virginia case treating that definitional cap as an operative bright line, and the drafting is awkward — the number lives inside a definition rather than in a rule — but the plain text is the plain text.

The ten where the check ends it — and what happens next

Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia all take the protection away as to the people who paid.

That is not the same as saying you are liable. It means the statute steps out of the way and ordinary premises liability law steps back in (we walk through what that duty looks like in Am I Liable if a Hunter Gets Hurt on My Land?): you owe your lessees the duty a landowner owes people lawfully on the property, which generally means warning about known hazards that are not obvious. It is a duty of reasonable care, not a guarantee. Most landowners meet it without thinking about it.

Three of the ten deserve a footnote:

  • Virginia is genuinely unsettled. Va. Code § 29.1-509(D) removes protection "when the landowner receives a fee," and § 29.1-509(A) defines fee as "any payment or payments of money to a landowner for use of the premises." But that same definition excludes "license fees, insurance fees, handling fees, transaction fees, administrative fees, rentals or similar fees" received from "governmental, not-for-profit, or private sources." Whether annual hunting-lease rent is an excluded "rental" or an included payment for use of the premises is not resolved on the face of the statute, and we found no Virginia appellate decision construing it. We list Virginia as "voids" because that is the conservative reading, and we are telling you it is arguable because that is the honest thing to do.
  • North Carolina hands you the replacement. N.C.G.S. § 38A-4(b) says nothing in the chapter "shall be construed to conflict with or render ineffectual a liability release, indemnification, assumption, or acknowledgment of risk agreement between the landowner and a person who uses the land." Since chapter 38A does not help a paid lease anyway, that release clause is the North Carolina protection. Written releases are not decoration there; they are the mechanism the legislature pointed at.
  • Missouri has a separate open question. A 2021 amendment (H.B. 369) rewrote § 537.348(3)(b) to exclude injuries in "any residential area," and defined that term to include "any land used for farming or agricultural purposes." On its face that removes farm ground from the Act entirely — charge or no charge. The clause is grammatically bolted onto a residential-area definition, so the reading is arguable, and we found no case construing it. Missouri farm landowners should not assume the Act covers them.

What survives no matter which column you are in

Every one of these statutes has a floor. Even in the six friendly states, the protection never covers deliberate harm, and in most states it does not cover a willful or malicious failure to warn about a known danger. The carve-backs are not uniform, and the differences matter:

Willful or malicious failure to guard or warn
The standard formula. GA, IA, KS, KY, MS, PA and others.
Gross negligence added
SC and TN reach further — gross negligence alone can defeat the shield.
Broadest carve-back
MO reaches gross negligence and ordinary negligence as to ultrahazardous conditions the owner knew or should have known about.
Narrowest
WV requires deliberate, willful or malicious infliction of injury — a higher bar than failure to warn. Ohio's sections state no carve-back at all.
Disclosure duty at signing
AL § 35-15-40(c)(1) removes protection if you knew at the time of the lease about a non-obvious hazard and did not tell the lessee.
Attractive nuisance preserved
IA and NC expressly keep the attractive-nuisance doctrine alive. Open wells, old silos, farm ponds.

Chart 3. Carve-backs that survive regardless of the charge analysis, grouped by breadth. Compiled from the operative text of each statute.

Read that Alabama disclosure duty again, because it generalizes. The single most common way a landowner loses one of these cases in any state is knowing about a hazard — a rotten stand, an abandoned well, a washed-out bridge, a bad low-water crossing — and not saying so in writing. That is the failure mode. Not the fee.

So what actually protects you?

The statute is one layer, and in half these states it is not available to you anyway. Three things do more work:

  1. A written lease with a hazard disclosure and an assumption-of-risk clause. In North Carolina the legislature explicitly told you this is the mechanism. Everywhere else it is simply good practice. Our sample hunting lease agreement and the contract walkthrough cover the clauses that matter.
  2. Liability insurance. In Texas it is a statutory door back into the protection. Everywhere else it is what actually pays a claim, since immunity is a defense and defenses cost money to raise. Start with our hunting lease insurance guide, because most farm policies do not cover paid hunting access the way owners assume.
  3. Writing down what you know. Walk the property, list every hazard, put the list in the lease, and have the lessees sign it. This is free and it is the single highest-value thing on the page.

The deeper point: a lease is not the thing that creates your risk. People are on your ground either way — permitted, trespassing, or leasing. A lease is the only one of those three where you get a signed document, a known group of names, a disclosure record and a party with an incentive to keep the place safe. In several of these states the lease also gets you a better statutory position than free permission would. The instinct that free access is safer than paid access is exactly backwards about half the time.

Landowner FAQ

Does charging for a hunting lease void my recreational use immunity?
In ten of the twenty states we reviewed, yes — as to the hunters who paid. In six it does not, and in four it depends on a specific condition: a dollar cap, a tax multiple, whether the ground is agricultural, or how the lease defines who may enter.

Which states protect a landowner who charges for hunting access?
Of the twenty we reviewed: Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma and Tennessee. Ohio, Oklahoma and Arkansas wrote lease payments out of the statutory definition of "charge"; Alabama passed a standalone hunting-lease immunity statute; Louisiana covers use "with or without charge" and says a lease does not affect it; Tennessee simply has no charge exception.

Would charging a nominal fee — a dollar a year — keep me protected?
Only in West Virginia, which sets an actual number ($50 per participant per year). The other statutes that void protection on a charge do not include a de minimis allowance in their text. Do not build a plan around a token fee.

If I trade access for work instead of money, am I still charging?
In Iowa, almost certainly yes — "charge" there means "any consideration," which reaches in-kind trades. In states using the narrow "admission price or fee" formula it is a closer question. Trading food-plot labor for hunting rights is not a reliable way around a charge exception.

Does posting my land affect this?
Mostly no, and where it is addressed it helps. Ohio applies its protection whether or not the owner denies entry to certain individuals; Louisiana says the limitation is unaffected by posting; Missouri protects owners "whether or not the land is posted." Most of the other statutes do not mention posting at all.

My tenant hunt club leases the ground — are they covered?
Often yes, separately from you. Most of these statutes define "owner" to include a tenant, lessee or occupant, so the club can claim the statute as to its own guests even where you cannot claim it as to the club. That is worth knowing when you negotiate who indemnifies whom.

Hunter FAQ

Does this change what I sign?
It should change what you expect to be asked to sign. In the ten "voids" states, landowners have a real incentive to put a release and an assumption-of-risk clause in front of you, and in North Carolina the statute specifically blesses that. A landowner asking for one is not being unreasonable; they are doing the thing their state's code points them toward.

Should a hazard disclosure worry me?
The opposite. A landowner who hands you a written list of the bad crossings, the old wells and the stands not to trust is a landowner who has thought about the property. Vague leases are the warning sign. Our guide to hunting lease red flags covers the rest.

Check the number before you check the statute

Almost every decision on this page — whether the Texas 20x cap binds you, whether a Maryland limited-entry structure is worth the trouble, whether the insurance premium is proportionate to the risk — starts with knowing what your ground is actually worth per year. Run it through the HuntLease Lease Price Calculator, then look at what comparable ground is leasing for in your area. If you are ready to list, start here.

And if you want the full picture for your state — pricing by county, seasons, CWD zones and the complete legal block — every state in the table above links to its guide.

Last updated: September 5, 2026. This article is general information about statutory text, not legal advice, and it is not a substitute for a lawyer licensed in your state. Recreational use statutes are amended regularly — Kentucky's was amended effective July 15, 2026, and Georgia's charge exception was rewritten in 2018 — so verify the current text before relying on it. Where the answer turns on how your lease is written or how your land is classified, that is exactly the situation in which an hour with a local attorney is cheap.